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In the Oct. 25, 1973 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine
Raymond Duff and A. G. M. Campbell reported on 299 deaths in the
special-care nursery of the Yale-New Haven Hospital from January,
1970 through June, 1972. Of this number, 43, or 14%, were the result
of withholding treatment) The report brought public attention and
analysis to procedures which previously had been practiced quietly,
inconsistently, and not always with careful rationale. In the intervening years, the topic of selective non treatment of defective newborns
has been receiving increased popular and professional attention. The
issues raised by this subject are manifold . Answers remain ambiguous,
in part because the questions are so new and are not themselves yet
clearly formulated. Nonetheless, three issues come forward for special
consideration: basic assumptions concerning human life, ethical analysis and formulation, and methods of implementation of policy developed.
Assumptions
Confrontation with death forces concern with life and its meaning.
Thus, in the matter of selective nontreatment of defective newborns,
we are compelled to bring to conscious examination our basic assumptions about human life. The ethical analysis which follows is built on
four premises.
First, defective newborns are human beings. Those who, like Joseph
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Fletcher in his statements on the topics,2 formulate their discussion
around the "humanhood" of the neonate, obscure matters and intensify visceral rather than rational response by abusing the normal sense
of words. The neonate can be no other kind of being than human . The
discussion is more properly set in terms of the "personhood" of this
human life, the quality or potential quality of this human life. 3 This
distinction is no mere semantic quibble, for while the designation of
defective newborns as human . does not lead us directly to clear decisions on appropriate treatment, acknowledgement of the humanity of
the neonate prevents us from dismissing the infant with little reflection . Human beings merit respect. The obligation to respect requires
that careful moral deliberation takes place.
Secondly, human beings have value. Thus, the defective newborn is
of value. In the discussion of the possibility of selective nontreatment,
there is no necessary implication that such infants are of lesser or no
value compared with other newborns. To recognize the value of the
neonate is to assert its fundamental worth and indicate a preference
for its protection. But once again, the recognition of value does not
itself dictate which decisions are to be made with regard to the object
of value. Values exist within a context of interrelated values, sometimes subordinate, sometimes superior, sometimes supplementary,
sometimes competitive. Thus one is led to ask, valuable in relation to
what? This points to my third premise.
Life is valued in relation to the attainment and exercise of other
values. Richard McCormick quotes a 1957 statement of Pope Pius XII
regarding the moral obligation to use ordinary m eans of life preservation: " A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most
men and would render the attainment of the higher , more important
good too difficult. Life, death, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends."4 McCormick proceeds to arguecorrectly, I think - that this means that life is valuable in its relation
to higher values, in particular to the values of human relationships and
relation to the transcendent, through relation to neighbor. On another
occasion, McCormick carries his analysis further. We often confuse
two meanings of the term " life," he points out. We may mean either
"the existence of vital and metabolic processes" or a state of or potential human personhood. The former is not valued for its own sake, but
as a foundation for the latter.5 To argue to the contrary that the
"basic" value of biological life must always take precedence over considerations of "higher values" of personal life is to risk collapsing the
wholistic view of man in which both physicality and spirituality are
integral to personhood. In analysis of decisions regarding the treatment or non treatment of defective newborns, therefore , life must be
viewed within a wider constellation of personal human values.
Fourth , just as reductionistic vitalism is questioned by an understanding of human being which places highest emphasis on a network
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of personal values, so death itself is relativized by the religious perspective. Death, as biological cessation, is not the Ultimate Enemy.
Because death is not the final negation, it cannot be reified into a
demonic god who is to be avoided at all costs. This has long been
recognized in the honoring of sacrifices for higher principles and loyalties. In recent years we have seen increasing acceptance of death as a
natural and, at times, suitable part of life. Despite some demur about
"the indignity of death with dignity," 6 most theologians and philosophers, as well as psychological therapists, have seen the contemporary openness to acceptance of death as a good and appropriate
human attitude. Acceptance of one's own death as appropriate
appears in the current literature of counseling the dying as a legitimate
goal of personal adjustment for the terminally ill person. Acceptance
of the appropriateness of the death of another is also proposed when,
for such reasons as discussed below, prolongation of the life of the
other is seen as meaningless. Thus, the death of defective newborns
cannot, a priori, be rejected as an absolute evil.
Paul Ramsey has argued that, viewed religiously, life is a gift and a
trust. Thus it is immoral,he claims, to choose death as an end. One
may allow death and choose how to live while dying, but should not
opt directly for death.? His point should be kept in mind. It reminds
us, as will be developed below, that western religious ethics has a bias
toward life. Though the conclusions of this essay differ from those of
Ramsey, acceptance of death, as described here, is neither refusal of a
gift nor violation of a trust. It is a recognition that gifts and trusts are
to be acted on responsibly. In the ethical analysis which follows, the
nature of this responsibility will be outlined.
Ethical Analysis
Basic to the humanistic ethical analysis which is rooted in the western religious heritage is a bias toward life. While death is not necessarily to be thought of fearfully, life is not to be considered lightly.
Human life in all its personal qualities is a value to be maintained. It is
to be given up only in carefully considered situations and for proportionate reasons. Like Ramsey, Leonard Weber proposes an ethical
viewpoint from which life is viewed as a gift.
When life is viewed as a gift ... there are limits to what one may do to it
and with it. To see life as a gift ... means to have an attitude of acceptance
and protection rather than of control. 8

This gift analogy, provided it does not lead to a hesitance to question
or make decisions regarding experiences which come to us,9 provides a
useful perspective. Appreciation and cultivation rather than rejection
are responses appropriate to gifts. Thus, a bias toward life is a natural
corollary of a world view which recognizes the world and human
existence as, in a general sense, a gracious bestowal.
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Two implications follow from this bias toward life. First, care
should be taken that if we err in judgment with regard to selective
nontreatment, we err on the side of life. We cannot avoid decisions;
and error is an unavoidable part of human decision-making. But we
can develop guidelines to fault, when necessary , in conservation of
life. A second implication, one to which we shall return later, is that
commitment to life logically should entail commitment to provision
of means to support and enhance life. As a society we are committing
ourselves to the preservation of lives of neonates who, under past
circumstances, would have died. We are doing so by furnishing increasingly sophisticated neonatal intensive care and other advanced forms
of lifegiving therapy. It is reasonable to assert, however, that to give
only existence to defective newborns, without provision for necessary
life-long maintenance and life enhancement, is only a partial commitment to life.
Because the choice between maintaining or letting go the lives of
defective newborns is of relatively recent origin, moralists have found
it difficult to establish specific ethical criteria by which to guide decisions. Assistance has been found, however, in a tradition which has
been developed to deal with a closely related issue. This is the traditional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary or heroic means
of life preservation. Widely accepted by physicians and philosophertheologians alike, this distinction provides guidance as to which
actions are morally mandatory (ordinary means) and which are elective (heroic means). Although the content of these two designations is
not without some ambiguity,10 most would use a person-centered
rather than procedure-centered definition . According to the perSOllcentered approach, two characteristics are central to declaring a
proposed means heroic and therefore elective: 1) lack of benefit, and
2) excessive personal or social burden accompanying the attainment or
use of these means. 11
In his Ethics at the Edges of Life, Ramsey argues that, at least in
relation to the dying, the ordinary-extraordinary analysis can and in
most cases should be reduced to a " medical indications" policy.12 He
concludes that the first characteristic just cited, lack of benefit, is
sufficient as a criterion of judgment. When treatment is no longer
medically indicated, i.e., beneficial, it may be ceased. One may choose
to live until death without this superfluous treatment. Even where
death is not imminent and some might talk about a patient's right to
.cefuse treatment, Ramsey prefers to avoid the ordinary-heroic terminology in favor of a medical indications approach. He sees referring the
decision-maker to objective elements in the context of the decision to
be made as the prime value in not entirely jettisoning the terminology.
Though medical indications, as Ramsey defines them, are integral to
the analysis which follows, especially at the first level of applying the
ordinary-extraordinary distinction, it is too narrow a base for the
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topic as described here. This is seen even in Ramsey's presentation. He
recognizes some right to refuse treatment by conscious persons not
imminently dying. He acknowledges in this regard that the traditional
ordinary-heroic distinction has been applied to those persons "whose
lives could not be meaningfully prolonged .... "13 Further, to speak as
Ramsey does of the possibility of refusing "life-prolonging" as contrasted with "life-saving" treatment when no more "curative" treatment is indicated does not avoid the quality of life considerations he
obviously wishes to tum aside. Life quality factors are surely a part of
life-prolongation decisions, and unless "cure" means only thorough or
substantial recovery, such considerations may be part of the definition
here as well. Finally, it is not entirely accurate to call a medical
indications policy solely a medical indications policy. Strictly speaking, there is medical benefit to treatment which, though it cannot
cure, can extend life even briefly. To choose, in one's way of dying, to
refuse such treatment is to do so not because it lacks benefit, but
because it lacks sufficient benefit. This matter of sufficient benefit
opens the door once again to indications which are not strictly medical. Ramsey's argument cautions us to define terms carefully . But the
traditional ordinary-extraordinary categories are still useful in consideration of the topic at hand and can be followed as proposed below.
Ordinary-Heroic Distinction
The traditional context for the application of the ordinary-heroic
distinction differs in some ways from the problem faced by those
considering treatment of newborns. The guidelines have been developed to assist judgment regarding persons both seriously and terminally ill. They have come to be applied to those imminently approaching death. Though this may be true of some defective newborns, it is
not always so. Procedures, sometimes sophisticated, sometimes rather
common, which reverse or significantly postpone drawing near to
death, can often be carried out. But the question may be raised as to
whether the procedures should be employed. Thus, the question with
defective neonates is not can death be postponed without significant
burden, but should it be? Can the ordinary-extraordinary distinction
be useful as a moral guide in that question? The answer appears to be
yes, with varying degrees of precision and certitude, at three levels.
At one level the analysis can be applied directly in a more traditional form. Some infants may be born with such extreme physical
defectiveness that death is imminent. Any procedures of life preservation followed would simply be a matter of prolongation of dying,
rather than restoration to living. In such situations, treatment would
clearly fall under the category of heroic, and therefore elective, means.
Ramsey's identification of extraordinary with "not medically indicated" would be most applicable here. The "benefit" of such treatment is negligible. Selective nontreatment of newborns in that context
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would generally be morally acceptable. 14
The ordinary-extraordinary reasoning can be extended to a second
level, suggested by Leonard Weber. He raises the questions: when does
the treatment of an infant impose an excessive burden on the child?
on the family? on society? When possible benefit to the infant can be
obtained only by means in which the burden imposed by the treatment becomes exc.essive, he argues, such means may morally be
omitted. 15 Applied to the child, this would appear to mean that when
the treatment itself brings extended subjection to pain beyond that of
the underlying condition, or so concentrates all energies on the sheer
struggle to survive that personal qualities are minimized, or would
result in severe treatment-induced disability or disease,16 such treatment may not necessarily be mandated.
This application is more difficult to use in the case of a possible
burden imposed by the treatment on family or society. Weber himself
recognizes this and is certain that in many instances the family could
be, at least in part, relieved of the burden by external assistance and
support. He also sees little likelihood of society being totally bereft of
resources. Such considerations have led David Smith to come to an
almost total prohibition of selective nontreatment when family or
social burden is the prime factor of deliberation. 17 Nonetheless, given
the lack of accessibility to sufficient assistance to all families and
given the competition for scarce monetary and manpower resources in
society, the application of the principle under consideration cannot be
absolutely set aside. Severe strain and dislocation can be brought on
families. And minimal provision of resources may not be sufficient to
assure extensive and adequate care. This concern with the burden on
family and society is important not so much with a view to its effect
on them, but insofar as it reflexively creates a burden on the infant as
well. Thus, concern with the effect of treatment can properly be
considered in the case of the neonate, the family, and society. The
further one proceeds from the immediate burden placed on the infant,
however, the more caution is called for.
The third level of application of the ordinary-extraordinary moral
reasoning is the most problematic in current discussion. It is at this
level that the most obvious questions of "quality of life" arise. Unlike
the second level, at which the procedures of life preservation are questioned, it is the quality o f life itself which is at issue here. Weber, who
avoids committing himself t o the quality of life ethic, notes the difficulty of dismissing the issue. His answer, as we have seen, is to focus
on the treatment rather than the underlying condition. Yet clearly it is
the negative quality of life to which the treatment leads that causes
him to admit such procedures as non-obligatory.
Ramsey's preference for a medical mdications policy for treatment
of the dying is in part based on his suspicion of quality of life judgments. This is amplified when he distinguishes between the dying and
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those who are perhaps incurable but not yet terminal. "Sometimes ...
infants are not born dying. They are only born defective and in need
of help." 18 As pointed out above, one of the implications of a lifebiased ethic is the obligation to provide such help . But one needs to
consider the possibility that not all help will be helpful. Ramsey
acknowledges this in the case of "non-curative" treatment of the
dying. He also considers the possibility of the "exception" of those
who are inaccessible to care, in states in which "care cannot be conveyed." 19 Perhaps to such possibilities there needs to be added
another - the infant who, through treatment, could be kept from
imminent death but whose life quality is so minimal that it renders
"help" not helpful and therefore extraordinary .
The argument of Richard McCormick is helpful. 20 He proposes a
line of thought which sees quality of life judgments as an appropriate
implication of traditional ordinary-heroic moral analysis. Examining
past applications of this tradition, he finds that the type of life a
person would have to live was often determinative of whether certain
actions were morally obligatory or not. He argues further that the
moral tradition within which the ordinary-extraordinary analysis is set
assumes that biological life "is a value to be preserved precisely as a
condition for other values, and therefore insofar as these other values
remain attainable." 21 It is the quality of life which finally renders
means ordinary or heroic. Discussion of selective nontreatment must
therefore take this issue under serious review.
Quality of Life Considerations
Recognizing the need for quality of life considerations is far easier,
however, than actually providing specific content to that formal criterion. Attempts at definition have varied. Joseph Fletcher's 15 positive
human criteria build out from neo-cortical functioning to include such
variables as minimal intelligence, a sense of time, concern for others,
curiosity, and idiosyncrasy.22 James Nelson points to socialness,
capacity to experience limitation and freedom, and religiosity or
intentionality.23 Michael Tooley focuses on self-consciousness. 24 The
debate among these moralists and others indicates the need to proceed
with caution in this matter.
The line of reasoning proposed by McCormick provides such a
cautious but useful starting point. As seen earlier, McCormick places
special emphasis on relational potential. Life is a good insofar as it
affords access to higher goods, in particular to the goods of social
relatedness and relationship to the transcendent through relationship
to neighbor. Thus, this relational potential would be the touchstone of
quality of· life judgments. McCormick argues, "It is neither inhuman
nor unchristian to say that there comes a point where an individual's
condition itself represents the negation of any truly human - i.e.,
relational - potential. When that point is reached, is not the best
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treatment no treatment?" He answers his own question: "When in
human judgment this potential is totally absent or would be, because
of the condition of the individual, totally subordinated to the mere
effort for survival, that life can be said to have achieved its potential." 25
Absence of minimal relational potential could probably be ascribed
to the anencephalic neonate. Such infants currently cannot ultimately
be kept from dying. Should technical means beyond those now available be developed which would sustain their lives, indefinitely or for
an extended period of time, these newborns would be rather clear
cases of appropriate candidates for nontreatment. On the other hand,
as Gustafson argues,26 it is the capacity for relationship that is one of
the strong reasons for the life preservation of Down's Syndrome infants. The judgment for other infants is not so clear. Early diagnosis
and, even more so, prognosis 27 are difficult. Moralists can point to the
criteria. Medical and psychological science will have to help fill out
these criteria with specificity. Individual decisions will be, made with
risk, but cannot be avoided. Caution and courage are called for.
It may be more difficult yet to determine when the condition of
the individual subordinates all else to "the mere effort for survival"
and thereby minimizes the capacity for relationship. Constant severe
pain , incapacitating response to treatment, or enduring non-consciousness may be elements of such a condition. Some moralists have drawn
upon the established maxim of medical ethics primum non nocere
(first do no harm) in this context. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., for
example, proposes the concept of "the injury of continued existence"
to apply where conditions of continuing life would not be tolerable. 28
In the same fashion, participants in a conference sponsored by the
University of California, San Francisco, included as one ethical proposition of their moral policy,
Life·preserving intervention should be understood as doing harm to an
infant who cannot survive infancy, or will live in intractable pain, or cannot
participate even minimally in hum an experience. 29

The interaction of human potential and the level of care and support provided are demonstrated in prognosis of the infant's future
relational ability within the context of subordinating all else to the
effort for survival. Relational potential may be kept at a low level if
initial and life-long support is not adequate. This fact in turn directs us
toward a closer look at the inference drawn earlier from the ideal of
"bias toward life." Commitment to life logically entails commitment to
provision of means to support and enhance life. Our assessment of
quality of life potential is based in part on our expectation of benefits
from treatment we are willing or able to provide. John A. Robertson
points out that the low quality of life expectation of some defective
newborns is due to the absence of provision made by society to bring
these children to their fullest capability. This lack of provision, which
is "the fault of social attitudes and the failings of healthy persons,"
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rather than congenital defectiveness in the infants alone, is often a
subtle factor in the judgment that the neonate has little potential. 30
Two implications can be drawn from these observations. First, in
following out the bias toward life, we must be assured that those
whom we keep alive are given full opportunity to maximize their
potential. Continuing research and development in neonatal, pediatric,
and adult medical care of persons with defects should be supplemented with provision of extensive social support services. If children are now kept alive who would previously have died , we are
obliged to help them achieve their highest quality of life . Families who
care for these children need the assistance of such services as special
education, physical therapies, and family counseling. Financial relief
and respite care may be necessary. Institutions for raising such children need to be fully funded and staffed so as to be compassionate
rather than custodial care. It is not fair to the newborn to choose a life
he would not otherwise have to suffer and not choose to allocate the
resources to' make that life livable. 31
Thus, a second implication which could be suggested is that some
possible criticism of selective nontreatment is unjustified unless we
provide the personal life enhancement to follow the biological life
preservation. The more we provide for life support and enhancement,
the less appropriate will selective nontreatment be. The converse may
also be true. The less often means of increasing life quality are made
available, the more choices not to maintain life may be justified. While
ethical and /or medical decisions ought not simply reflect current
structures of social justice, neither ought they be made without any
reference to them. Recognizing that financial and personnel resources
are not inexhaustible, allocation decisions will have to be made and
consequences faced honestly.
We have seen, then, that life-biased ethics will incline us toward
caution in judgment about selective nontreatment and that it urges us
to expand life-enhancing services, thus increasing the number of
neonates for whom a life preservation decision is appropriate. Recognizing that avoidance of death is not always the most suitable stance,
we have found help in decision-making in the tradition of the ordinary-extraordinary means analysis. This has led us to see that selectiv~
nontreatment may be a moral decision when dying is irreversibly proximate, when the means of life maintenance themselves create excessive
burden, and when relational potential is negligible or unable to be
exercised.
Implementation
Although a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this essay,
directions of thought regarding implementation of the foregoing moral
analysis are offered. Issues are complex here, especially in light of excesses which are to be avoided. Two major concerns come to mind: who
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is to make the decision? What legal status should such decisions have?
There is little moral or legal question over the necessity or propriety
of proxy consent in the treatment of defective newborns . .Paul Ramsey has recently focused attention, however, on the parameters of the
acceptable range of decisions to be made as he questions the criteria
used in the deliberation process. He states that both covenant loyalty
to others and familial, medical, and legal obligations "require that a
medical indications policy alone be applied where another, voiceless,
human life is at stake." 32 To do otherwise, he argues , is to open the
door to quality of life judgments, to risk circularity of r'easoning in the
"reasonable man" approach to proxy consent, and to chance ascribing
rather than discovering the best interest of the patient. Although the
caution which prompts Ramsey's concern must not be set aside, we
have already seen that criteria other than medical indications might
morally be applied. Thus, we must cautiously enter the domain of
substituted judgment.
There are at least four possible loci of decision-making : the parents,
the physician, a review committee, and the courts. Each has its benefits and drawbacks. Each does, in fact, have a role to play , but the
preponderance of opinion among moralists has given priority to parents. Parents, of course, do not own their children. They are not free
morally or legally to do whatever they wish with their children. Weber
correctly observes that "it is better to speak of the obligations rather
than the rights of parents." Where obligation lies, there lies also a
degree of priority in decision-making. "They have the obligation to
care for their children and the obligation to make decisions that seriously affect the future of their children." 33 The relationship of decision and nurturing can also be noted here . Engelhardt points out that
"the decisions in these matters correctly lie in the hands of the parents, because it is primarily in terms of family that children exist and
develop .... " 34 Both the general obligation of parents to children and
their specific role in nurturing direct us to the parents as having
primary claim on the role of decision-maker.
Although at an earlier point in the development of neonatal medicine, the press of very limited time often forced physicians into the
decision-making role, modern procedures make this decreasingly true.
This being so, Daniel Maguire argues that the doctor may be an
inappropriate person to be given a primary role in decisions due to
such factors as traditional professional roles, the trend toward mixing
experimentation and care, lack of specific ethical training, and fear of
legal complications. 35 The physician does, however, have medical
information necessary to make an informed decision. Facts about the
infant's current status and probabilities regarding future developments
must be shared with the parents. Thus, the first role of the doctor in
this process is as a source of information. 36
A hospital review committee, made up of institutional personnel,
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possibly including community representatives, has the disadvantages
of emotional abstraction and the compromise nature of decision-bycommittee. Such a committee, nevertheless, might playa useful role in
establishing general hospital guidelines within which parents and
physicians could work. Similarly, the courts represent the wider interests of society. Not always equipped to be the first voice of decision,
the courts playa role in appeal of decisions at a lower level. However,
if other courts follow the recent decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Joseph Saikewicz,37 Lhey will
playa more central role than proposed here. Some ambiguity remains
about the exact implications of the Saikewicz decision , but it did
intent! to claim to the court's jurisdiction primary decision-making
prerogative in at least certain nontreatment contexts. Although it now
appears to include fewer cases than first feared by many physicians
and ethicists,38 this ruling will result in more decisions in the courts.
The more this is restricted to conflict of judgment situations mentioned below, the less will the court involve itself in actions outside its
special competence.
Thus we return to the parents as primary locus of decision. Some
argue that the emotional involvement of parents makes them unfit for
decision. Deliberation would be swayed by rejection of the infant,
growing out of shock or disappointment,39 or by need to compensate
due to feelings of guilt. Studies are mixed on this matter. While some
show the danger does exist, others have shown it can be less of a
problem than anticipated. Raymond Duff has observed that "if families regardless of background are heard sympathetically and at length
and are given information and answers to their questions in words
they understand, the pro blems of their children as well as the
expected benefits and limits of any proposed care can be understood
clearly in practically all instances." 40 Duff found the parental decisions to have been thoughtful and reasonable. Rosalyn Darling also
found data suggesting that parents can be responsible in their judgments. Her study showed that though many parents admitted disappointment, the typical attitude came to be "realistic acceptance."
In fact, she found physicians to define the situation as a tragedy more
often than parents. 41 Considering this possibility for careful and
thoughtful decision-making by parents and noting that parental reaction may be corollated with the nature of the defect and options of
community support perceived to be available,42 we recall the point
made earlier. If we as a society wish to establish a bias toward life, we
must also make commitments to provision of support and enrichment
resources.
Priority in the decision-making process and the generally responsible action of parents would not, of course, guarantee that choices
will always be correct. Here is the second point at which physicians
and society, through review co mmittees or the courts, may play an
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important role. We have seen their role in provlSlon of information
and guidelines. Here the issue is intervention. When the parents' decision can reasonably be construed as acceptable, no steps should be
taken to counter that choice. Three points of intervention may be
appropriate, however: one opposing nontreatment, two pursuing it.
Engelhardt argues that "society has a right to intervene and protect
children for whom parents refuse care ... when such care does not
constitute a severe burden and when it is likely that the child can be
brought to good quality of life." 43 Engelhardt views such intervention
as necessary both for the sake of the specific child and with the social
impact in mind that selective non treatment in such cases could have in
undermining respect and care for children in a more general sense. The
link between intervention and responsibility for nurturing should be
called to mind. To overrule the parents' decision may require us to
provide them with counseling and community support to help them
fulfill the role we are asking of them. Or we must make available
adequate institutional care for children whose parents cannot or will
not raise them . To intervene without such provision is unfair both to
parents and children.
To intervene in favor of nontreatment may be more difficult to
justify, given the recognition of parental obligation to protect and care
for their children and covenantal moral and legal obligations to continue care once it is begun. Two possibilities for such intervention
have been suggested and should at least be mentioned. Engelhardt
proposes that a challenge to the decision to continue treatment might
be appropriate where extended life for the infant would lead to enduring pain, etc., which has been lightly considered by the parents. 44 This circumstance would seem rare. Also possible is the situation brought about by the problem of allocation of scarce resources.
One of the propositions put forward by the Sonoma Conference states:
In cases of limited availability of neonatal intensive care, it is ethical to
terminate therapy for an infant with poor prognosis in order to provide care
for an infant with a much better prognosis. 45

Such a stance is not above moral challenge. 46 We have noted above
the general acceptance of the principles of parental obligation to care
and the covenantal obligation of care which has begun. Applied to the
situation under consideration, this would seem to mean that intervention in favor of · non treatment in such cases will probably also be
infrequent. While intervention in favor of nontreatment cannot be
excluded out of hand, challenge against nontreatment is more easily
justified and would no doubt be the more common.
A thorough and clear legal review of selective nontreatment of
defective newborns has been provided by John Robertson 47 and will
not be treated extensively here. A few remarks will suffice. Direct,
active taking of the life of the newborn (not under consideration in
this essay) is clearly defined legally as murder. But participants in
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selective nontreatment, family or medical personnel, could also be
held criminally liable, for charges ranging from homicide to neglect to
violation of child abuse laws. Although prosecution has been rare and
conviction even more so, there is no assurance that it will always be
so. The spotlight thrown by more public discussion of this issue may
encourage legal action. With increased legal action or without it, the
threat of prosecution may inhibit parents and medical personnel in
their decision-making. These deliberations are difficult to carry out
apart from legal considerations which affect them. If we accept as
moral the decision for selective nontreatment, we must allow those
who make the decisions to do so without excessive fear of the law.
Carte blanche in decision-making is neither legally nor morally
acceptable. Drafting of clear and useful legislation has not moved far
with regard to other contexts of decisions to allow death. There is no
reason to believe it will prove easier with regard to newborns. Some
argue that any legislation would prove restrictive to decisions currently made quietly in the absence of specific law. This overlooks the
possible persecution under existing law and the effect on decisionmaking of fear of this possible legal action, but it does caution us to
proceed carefully in this matter. Two suggestions are in order. First,
laws which permit rather than mandate decisions are preferable. This
would maintain respect for a bias toward life, avoid the spectre of
assigning certain infants to death, and still allow for decisions that
should be made. Second, legislation and the courts can look after the
processes by which decisions are made to assure that full deliberation
has taken place. 48 To involve the courts in all initial deliberations
would be cumbersome, time-consuming, and counterproductive to the
process being pursued. Development of fair yet cautious laws will not
be necessary. But as Duff and Campbell urged in their 1973 article, "If
working out these dilemmas ... is a violation of the law, we believe
the law should be changed." 49
Conclusion
Each year parents, physicians, and courts are facing questions of
treatment or nontreatment of defective newborns. Developing ethical
reflection, changing medical possibilities, and increasing court rulings
render the decision-making process, already painful and difficult for
those involved, even more complicated. Against the background of
personal anguish and perplexing deliberation for those who must come
to the point of decision, continued effort must go into ethical analysis
and policy formulation.
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